Evidences suggest that in some villages of developing countries, agents rely on mutual insurance agreements to deal with income or expenditure shocks. In this paper we analyze which risk-sharing networks can be sustained in the long run when individuals are farsighted rather than myopic, in the sense that they are able to forecast how other agents would react to their actions. In particular, we study whether the farsightedness of the agents leads to a reduction of the tension between stability and e¢ ciency that arises when individuals are myopic. We …nd that if the cost of establishing a mutual insurance agreement is extremely high or extremely small, myopic and farsighted agents form the same risk-sharing networks. For intermediate costs, the farsightedness of the agents plays a crucial role in determining which network is stable. In addition, if a con ‡ict between myopic stability and e¢ ciency exists, it may be solved with the introduction of farsighted agents.
Introduction
In this paper, we focus on the formation of risk-sharing networks. There are regions in developing countries where economic ‡uctuations are important but the access to a formal insurance market is limited. A growing empirical literature (see for instance Towsend, 1994; Morduch, 1991; Paxson, 1992; Jacoby and Skou…as, 1997) shows that consumption patterns are however relatively constant over time in these regions. This suggests that individuals rely on informal risk-sharing agreements to help those that are in need. Empirical studies (see Fafchamps, 1992; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003) also reveal that risk-sharing does not take place at the village level but rather within networks of relatives. An important feature of the transfers provided through networks is that the level of the transfer asked or o¤ered by an agent to her linked partners depends on the entire network architecture. Suppose for instance that agents A and B are involved in a mutual insurance relationship and agent B, which has been infected by an epidemic, incurs large medical expenditures. The ability for agent A to help agent B depends, among other things, on the requests addressed to agent A by her other partners which have also been infected. Similarly, the amount of transfer asked by agent B to agent A depends on the help provided to B by others. The entire risk-sharing network thus determines each agent's wellbeing.
Friends or members of a family are more inclined to enter into reciprocal insurance agreements. This leads Bloch, Genicot and Ray (2005) to the conclusion that a network comes …rst and transfers comes after. With this in mind, they have assumed that the network is exogenously given and they have studied whether it can be sustained with appropriate transfers in the sense that each agent conforms to the transfer scheme ex-post, once the uncertain income shock occurs. analyze a complementary approach, where agents establish their informal insurance relationships endogenously, assuming that linked pairs share equally their income and that agents commit to the transfer scheme.
1 They consider agents which are ex ante homogeneous, but di¤er through their position in the net-1 Rosenweig and Stark (1989) have provided evidence that marriages of daughters are driven by risk-sharing concerns in India, supporting the idea that bilateral relationships might be formed strategically in order to be protected against future income ‡uctuations. Murgai et al. (2000) have found that the heterogeneity of the agents in terms of kinship, geographical proximity and the degree of risk exposure are important in explaining network formation.
work. They show that the e¢ cient risk-sharing networks are such that each agent in the population is indirectly connected to the others, involving the maximal level of insurance in the population, and they …nd that networks formed by myopic agents connect fewer individuals than the e¢ cient ones.
This paper analyzes which risk-sharing networks can be sustained in the long run when agents are farsighted, rather than myopic, in the sense that they are able to forecast how other agents would react to their actions. In particular, we study whether the farsightedness of the agents leads to a reduction of the tension between stability and e¢ ciency that may arise when agents are myopic. Myopic agents are assessing the pro…tability of their decision to create new mutual insurance agreements or to remove old ones by considering that their choice has no impact on others'decision. However, since the entire risk-sharing network structure determines agents' well-being, the incentives for a pair of agents to have a mutual insurance agreement depend on the full architecture of others'agreements. Thus, if a pair of agents initiates a new insurance partnership with each other, they should anticipate that their decision creates a new environment where other partnerships will emerge or old ones will be deleted. Farsighted agents form such anticipations when they take a decision. We adopt the notion of pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks due to Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) to determine which networks are formed by farsighted agents. 2 We …nd that if the cost of establishing a mutual insurance agreement is very high or very small, then myopic and farsighted agents form the same risk-sharing networks. For intermediate cost values, the farsightedness of the agents plays a crucial role in determining which network is stable. In addition, if a con ‡ict between stability and e¢ ciency exists when agents are myopic, it may be solved with the introduction of farsighted agents.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some notations and de…nitions for networks, and we present the model of risk-sharing networks of . We then describe the structure of e¢ cient networks.
In Section 3, we investigate the formation of stable risk-sharing networks when agents are myopic. In Section 4, we provide a characterization of the pairwise farsightedly stable set of risk-sharing networks. We then compare the stable set of 2 Other approaches to farsightedness in network formation are suggested by the work of Xue (1998), Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2004) , Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004) , Page, Wooders and Kamat (2005) , Dutta, Ghosal, and Ray (2005) , and Page and Wooders (2009). networks obtained when agents are myopic and when they are farsighted. In Section 5, we conclude.
Model and notation Networks
A network (N; g) is de…ned by a set of agents N = f1; : : : ; ng and a list g of which pairs of individuals among the agent set N are linked to each other. 3 For sake of notation we simply use the set of links g to refer to the network when the player set N is …xed. The network relationships are reciprocal and the network is thus modeled as a non-directed graph. Individuals are the nodes in the network and links indicate bilateral relationships between individuals. We write ij 2 g to indicate that i and j are linked under the network g. Let g N be the collection of all subsets of N with cardinality 2, so g N is the complete network. The set of all possible networks on N is denoted by G and consists of all subsets of g N . The network obtained by adding the link ij to an existing network g is denoted g + ij and the network that results from deleting the link ij from an existing network g is denoted g ij. For any network g, let N (g) = fi 2 N j 9 j such that ij 2 gg be the set of agents who have at least one link in the network g. The degree of agent i in a network g is the number of links that involve that agent: d i (g) = #fj 2 N j ij 2 gg. The total number of links of a network g is given by d(g) = 1=2 i2N d i (g). A path in a network g 2 G between i and j is a sequence of agents i 1 ; : : : ; i K such that i k i k+1 2 g for each k 2 f1; : : : ; K 1g with i 1 = i and i K = j. A network g is connected if for each pair of agents i and j such that i 6 = j there exists a path in g between i and j. A component of a network (N; g), is a nonempty subnetwork (N 0 ; g 0 ) such
is connected, and (ii) if i 2 N 0 and ij 2 g, then j 2 N 0 and ij 2 g 0 . 4 The set of components of g is denoted by C(g). A component of a network is minimally connected if the path between any two agents in that component is unique. The set of networks composed of minimally connected components is denoted G m . Formally, G m = fg 2 G j @(S; h) 2 C(g ij) such that i; j 2 S, for each ij 2 gg. A network is minimally connected if all the agents are in 3 Throughout the paper we use the notation for weak inclusion and for strict inclusion.
Finally, # will refer to the notion of cardinality. 4 This de…nition of components is proposed by Jackson (2008) and implies that an agent without links in a network is considered as a component.
the same minimally connected component. The set of minimally connected networks
. We use the measure of betweenness centrality of Freeman (1977) . Letting P i (kj) denote the number of shortest paths between k and j that i lies on, and P (kj) = i = 2fk;jg P i (kj), the betweenness centrality of a agent i is given by Ce B i (g) = (2=((n 1)(n 2))) k6 =j:i = 2fk;jg P i (kj)=P (kj). This measure will be used to determine the central agents of a line. A line is a minimally connected network (S; h) such that no agent in S has more than two links. Noting by g S the collection of all subsets of S with cardinality 2, so g S is the complete network among the agents in S, the set of lines is
and the path between any two agents in S is uniqueg. The central elements of a line (S; h) 2 C L are the agents with the highest measure of betweenness centrality among the agents in S. Formally, for
A agent i is a central agent of the line (S; h) if by deleting the links of that agent, we reach a network in which the other agents of S are in two components and the di¤erence in the size of those components is smaller than or equal to one.
G
L is the set of lines of n agents,
Model
We further investigate the model of where n exante identical individuals are risk averse and face shocks to their income. Each individual's income is a random variable which is independently and identically distributed. agents may create links with each other. By doing so, they commit to pool their income with all the members of the component to which they belong and to share the pooled income equally among them. 5 It follows that risk-sharing bene…ts only depend on the number of individuals in the component. Each direct link ij results in a cost c to both i and j. These costs cannot be shared with other members of the component. motivate this assumption by saying that "some costs, such as the time incurred to build a relation are not easy to compensate or transfer. In the case of marriage, this cost would be, for example, the time and money involved in courtship and providing a dowry".
5 After income shocks are realized, linked pairs meet sequentially and randomly and share equally their current revenue. With many rounds of such meetings, in the limit an individual's monetary holdings converge to the mean of realized income in the component.
The utility of agent i in the network g is given by
where d i (g) indicates the number of links agent i has and s i denotes the size of the component to which she belongs, s i = #S, where i 2 S and (S; h) 2 C(g). Notice that the utility function is such that the bene…ts of risk-sharing increase with the size of the component, but at a decreasing rate.
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E¢ ciency
In evaluating societal welfare, we use the notion of strong e¢ ciency. A network
The total utility of the agents in a network g composed of k minimally connected components is given
The set of strongly e¢ cient networks is thus the set of minimally connected networks if c < 1=2, it consists only of the empty network when c > 1=2, while any network composed of minimally connected components maximizes the sum of agent's utilities if c = 1=2.
We also use the weaker notion of Pareto e¢ ciency. A network g is Pareto e¢ cient if there does not exist any g 0 2 G such that u i (g 0 ) u i (g) for all i with at least one strict inequality. To determine the Pareto e¢ cient networks, we introduce the threshold b s, which is such that a agent prefers strictly to have l links in a component of size s b s rather than l + 1 links in a component of size n. The threshold b s is de…ned as follows:
In Proposition 1, we show that a network g composed of minimally connected components of size s b s is Pareto e¢ cient if c 1=2. All the proofs are given in the appendix.
This proposition does not provide a complete characterization of the set of Pareto e¢ cient networks. Throughout the paper we will illustrate our main results by means of the four agents case (n = 4).
6 See for general allocation rules having this property. 3 Stable risk-sharing networks when agents are myopic
In this section, we investigate the formation of stable risk-sharing networks when agents are myopic. We adopt the notion of pairwise myopically stable sets of networks due to Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) which is a generalization of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) pairwise stability notion. A pairwise myopically stable set of networks is such that from any network outside this set, there is a myopic improving path leading to some network in the set, and each deviation outside the set is deterred because the deviating agents do not prefer the resulting network.
The notion of myopic improving path is due to Jackson and Watts (2002) and is de…ned as a sequence of networks that might be observed when agents are adding or deleting links, one at a time, in order to improve their current payo¤. Formally, a myopic improving path from a network g to a network g 0 6 = g is a …nite sequence of networks g 1 ; : : : ; g K with g 1 = g and g K = g 0 such that for any k 2 f1; : : : ; K 1g
For a given network g, we denote by M (g) the set of networks that can be reached through a myopic improving path form g. De…nition 1. A set of networks G G is pairwise myopically stable if
, and (ii).
Conditions (ia) and (ib) in De…nition 1 capture deterrence of external deviations.
In Condition (ia) the addition of a link ij to a network g 2 G that leads to a network outside G is deterred because the two agents involved do not prefer the resulting network to network g. Condition (ib) is a similar requirement, but then for the case where a link is severed. Condition (ii) requires external stability. External stability asks for the existence of a myopic improving path from any network outside G leading to some network in G. Notice that the set G (trivially) satis…es Conditions (ia), (ib), and (ii) in De…nition 1. This motivates Condition (iii), the minimality condition. In what follows, we provide a partial characterization of the risk-sharing networks that are in the pairwise myopically stable set of networks. Jackson and Watts (2002) de…ne the notion of a closed cycle. A closed cycle is a set of networks C such that for any g 2 C and g 0 2 Cnfgg, there exists a myopic improving path from g to g 0 , and each myopic improving path emanating from a network in the set C does not reach a network outside C. Each pairwise stable network is a closed cycle. Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) show that the pairwise myopically stable set of networks coincide with the set of networks that belong to a closed cycle. show that the set of closed cycles consists only of pairwise stable networks if a pairwise stable risk-sharing network exists. In addition, they have analyzed the architecture of pairwise stable networks and the conditions on the parameters that guarantee the existence of such pairwise stable networks.
To summarize their results, let s be the critical size of a component such that the bene…ts of adding another member to the component is less than the cost of doing so:
An 
we have that #S 0 = s g. show that the pairwise myopically stable set of networks G is such that G G. Furthermore, the two sets
Proposition 2 there is a myopic improving path from any network to each network in G . Thus each network from the set G belongs to the same closed cycle.
In the remaining part of this section, we provide additional properties of the risksharing networks that are in the pairwise myopically stable set of networks when pairwise stable networks do not exist. Let us introduce another threshold, s, which is the maximal integer such that two agents in di¤erent components of size s=2 are willing to add a link between them. Formally, it is de…ned as follows:
Notice that s s for c < 1=2 with the inequality being strict for c < 1=4. Notice also that by concavity of the utility function, two agents of di¤erent components of size s < s=2 are willing to add a link between them. Also, the addition of a link is 7 The operator int(x) gives the integer part of the real x.
not pro…table for at least one of the agents involved if one of them is currently in a component of size bigger than s=2. 8 Let b G denote the set of networks that satisfy the four following properties. First, they are composed of minimally connected components. Second, they involve components of size smaller than or equal to s.
Third, no agent has more than s=2 links. Fourth, they contain at least s 1 links, but no more than n 1 int((n 1)=s) links. Formally, From networks composed of big-sized components, agents are willing to cut links with peripheral agents (agents having only one link), as long as the size of their component is bigger than s . But from networks composed of small-sized components, no myopic improving path is leading to a network in which the size of a component is bigger than s since, if it was the case, a member of a component of size s > s=2
should add a link at some point in the path, but the addition of that link is not pro…table. Similarly, starting from a network in which no agent has more than s=2
links, every path leading to a network in which an agent, say i, has more than s=2
links, is such that agent i has to add a link at some network in which she has s=2
links. The addition of that link is not pro…table since agent i is in a component of size bigger than s=2 before adding that link. Each network of the pairwise myopically stable set of networks has more than s 1 links since no agent is willing to cut a link if there are s agents or less in her component. Finally, each network in G has less than n 1 int((n 1)=s) links as this number of links is obtained when the agents form a maximal number of components of size s.
In Proposition 4, we show that when no network is pairwise stable, the pairwise myopically stable set of networks contains networks whose total number of links vary between s 1 and n 1 int((n 1)=s). That is, the less connected networks of the pairwise myopically stable set of networks have exactly s 1 links, while the most connected networks of the pairwise myopically stable set have exactly Proposition 4. The pairwise myopically stable set of networks G contains a network
; 1=n] when n is odd.
The idea of the proof is the following. Take a network g 2 G that belongs to the pairwise myopically stable set of networks G. The network g is not pairwise stable, since s > s and n > s + s , which implies that two agents of di¤erent components, say i and j, are willing to add a link between them. Thus, the network g + ij also belong to G. From g + ij, some agents are in a component of size bigger than s and are willing to cut a link with a peripheral agent as long as there are more than s agents in the component. By repeating this argument, we can show that there is a myopic improving path from g to g 0 such that only s agents are connected in g 0 . By de…nition of a closed cycle, g 0 2 G. In g 0 and in the following networks, a pair of agents that are in components of same size or of size that di¤ers by 1 add a link between them until they build a maximum number of components of size s. The last move in a path leading to a new component of s agents involve the addition of a link between two agents of di¤erent components of size s=2, which is thus pro…table. The other moves are pro…table by concavity of the utility function.
Notice that Proposition 4 does not apply if c 2 [(n 1)=(n(n+1)); 1=n] when n is odd. This is explained by the fact that an agent from a component of size (n + 1)=2
is not willing to add a link with an agent from a component connecting (n 1)=2 agents for those cost parameters. To illustrate this, consider for example that n = 7
and c = 1 9
implying that s = 8. For those parameters value, int((n 1)=s) = 0, so that the proposition would suggest that at least a strongly e¢ cient network is in the pairwise myopically stable set of networks. However, no minimally connected network belongs to this set, since an agent from a component of size 4 is not willing to add a link with a member of a component of size 3 for such costs.
Let us summarize the results obtained concerning the structure of risk-sharing networks formed by myopic agents and let us compare them with the e¢ cient ones.
Each network included in the pairwise myopically stable set of networks is less or equally connected than a strongly e¢ cient network. If the cost of forming links is very small, that is if c 1=(n(n 1)), then the critical size of a component which is such that an agent is willing to cut a link with a peripheral agent is bigger than the size of the population, s n. In that case, each minimally connected network is pairwise stable since any two agents that are not indirectly connected are willing to add a link between them. The set of strongly e¢ cient networks thus coincides with the pairwise myopically stable set of networks. For other parameters values, if a pairwise stable network exists, it is not strongly e¢ cient since the pairwise stable networks are composed of components of size s , and s < n when c > 1=(n(n 1)). If a pairwise stable network does not exist and the cost of links formation is small, that is if 1=(n(n 1)) < c 1=n when n is even or if 1=(n(n 1)) < c (n 1)=(n(n + 1)) when n is odd, then some strongly e¢ cient networks belong to the pairwise myopically stable set of networks. Ine¢ cient networks also belong to this set. The most ine¢ cient networks of the set being those where s < n agents are indirectly connected to each other while the remaining agents are not sharing the risk they face with anybody. If a pairwise stable network does not exist and the cost of links formation is high, that is if 1=n < c < 1=2, each network included in the pairwise myopically stable set of networks is strictly less connected than a strongly e¢ cient network. Notice also that the di¤erence in the total number of links between the less connected networks and the most connected networks of the pairwise myopically stable set of networks is increasing with the number of agents. For high values of n, very ine¢ cient networks belong to the pairwise myopically stable set of networks.
Even if no strongly e¢ cient network can be formed by myopic agents, they still can form Pareto e¢ cient networks. It is the case for example if n = 6 and c = 1=6. The pairwise stable networks are then composed of 2 minimally connected components of size 3. Those networks are Pareto e¢ cient but not strongly e¢ cient. Thus, when 1=(n(n 1)) < c, a pairwise stable network is not strongly e¢ cient but it could be Pareto e¢ cient. When a pairwise stable network does not exist, the most ine¢ cient network of the pairwise myopically stable set of networks is not Pareto e¢ cient.
Stable risk-sharing networks when agents are farsighted
In this section, we analyze the formation risk-sharing networks when agents are farsighted, in the sense that if an agent induces a move from a network, she is able to anticipate that others might in turn create new links or delete existing ones.
Myopic agents are assessing the pro…tability of their decision to create new mutual insurance agreements or to remove old ones by considering that their choice has no impact on others'decision. However, since the entire risk-sharing network structure determines agents'well-being, the incentives for a pair of agents to have a mutual insurance agreement depend on the full architecture of others'agreements. Thus, if a pair of agents initiates a new insurance partnership with each other, they should anticipate that their decision creates a new environment where other partnerships will emerge or old ones will be deleted. Farsighted agents form such anticipations when they take a decision.
Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) have proposed a solution concept to address the question of stability when agents are farsighted: the pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks. Before de…ning the concept, let us introduce the notion of a farsighted improving path, which is the counterpart of the myopic improving path described in the previous section. A farsighted improving path is a sequence of networks that can emerge when agents form or sever links based on the improvement the end network o¤ers relative to the current network. Each network in the sequence di¤ers by one link from the previous one. If a link is added, then the two agents involved must both prefer the end network to the current network, with at least one of the two strictly preferring the end network. If a link is deleted, then it must be that at least one of the two agents involved in the link strictly prefers the end network. Formally, it is de…ned as follows. A farsighted improving path from a network g to a network g 0 6 = g is a …nite sequence of networks g 1 ; : : : ; g K with g 1 = g
and g K = g 0 such that for any k 2 f1; : : : ; K 1g either:
For a given network g, let F (g) = fg 0 2 G j there is a farsighted improving path from g to g 0 g.
We now introduce the concept of pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks. It is a set of networks such that (i) the deletion or addition of any link from a network in the set is deterred by a credible threat of ending worse o¤, once other agents further react to the initial deviation, (ii) from any network outside the set, there is a farsighted improving path leading to some network in the set, and (iii) no proper subset of this set satis…es the two …rst conditions. Formally, pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks are de…ned as follows.
De…nition 2 (Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch, 2009) . A set of networks G G is pairwise farsightedly stable if
and (ii).
Condition (i) in De…nition 2 requires the deterrence of external deviations. Condition (ia) captures that adding a link ij to a network g 2 G that leads to a network outside of G; is deterred by the threat of ending in g 0 : Here g 0 is such that there is a farsighted improving path from g + ij to g 0 : Moreover, g 0 belongs to G; which makes g 0 a credible threat. Condition (ib) is a similar requirement, but then for the case where a link is severed. Condition (ii) in De…nition 2 requires external stability and implies that the networks within the set are robust to perturbations. From any network outside of G there is a farsighted improving path leading to some network in G.
Notice that the set G (trivially) satis…es Conditions (ia), (ib), and (ii) in De…nition 2. This motivates the requirement of a minimality condition, namely Condition (iii).
Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) have shown that a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks always exists.
We now provide a partial characterization of the pairwise farsightedly stable set of risk-sharing networks. We analyze the case of very small costs of links formation, the case of small costs of links formation and the case of high costs of links formation.
Very small costs of links formation
Proposition 5 characterizes partially the pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks when the costs of links formation satis…es c < 1=(n(n 1)). For such costs, we …nd that (a) each pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks contains at least one strongly e¢ cient network, (b) each set G composed of a minimally connected
i 2 N is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks, and (c) each set G composed of a minimally connected network g 1 2 G M and another minimally connected net-
for some agent i 2 N and g 1 and g 2 are not star networks (i.e. they are not such that one agent connects directly all the others)
is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks.
for each pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks G.
pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks.
(c) The set G = fg 1 ; g 2 g G M such that u i (g 1 ) 6 = u i (g 2 ) for some agent i 2 N and both g 1 and g 2 are not star networks is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks.
Part (a) of the proposition is derived from the fact that a line of n agents Pareto dominates each network which is not strongly e¢ cient when the cost of links formation is very small. It then follows that the second condition of the de…nition of the pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks cannot be satis…ed if the set does not include at least a strongly e¢ cient network. Part (b) and (c) of the proposition are driven by the fact that an agent that has l links in a component of size s is willing to cut a link if in the end network she has l + x links or less in a component of size bigger than or equal to s + x, for 0 < x n s when c 1=(n(n 1)). Then, the agents having the highest utility in a minimally connected network g 2 G M , those having only one link in g, are willing to cut successively all their links from any other network, if they anticipate that the network g will form. Once all these links are cut, the agents that have two links in g are now also willing to cut their links if they anticipate that the network g will form in the end, since they are indirectly connected to less than n agents at the current network. By continuing this line of reasoning, farsighted agents reach the empty network looking forward to the formation of the network g. Once in the empty network, agents are willing to build each link of the network g. Since multiple networks are payo¤ equivalent for the agents, 
Small costs of links formation
In the next proposition, we show that each set composed of a line g of n agents
and of all other lines where the payo¤ of the agents is equal to their payo¤ in g constitutes a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks if the cost of links formation satis…es c < 1=n when n is even, or c < (n 1)=(n(n + 1)) when n is odd.
i 2 N g is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks if n is even and c < 1=n or if n is odd and c < (n 1)=(n(n + 1)).
In the proof of this proposition, it is …rst established that there is a farsighted improving path from any network outside G(g 0 ) leading to each network in G(g 0 ).
From a network outside G(g 0 ), farsighted agents which have more links than in the line g 0 of n agents or which have the same number of links but are indirectly connected to less than n agents, cut their links until the empty network is reached, looking forward to the formation of the network g 0 . From the empty network, the agents add links in order to build g 0 such that the last link to be added is the central link of the line. This last move is pro…table since it involves the addition of a link between two members of components of size n=2 s=2. The addition of each other link from the empty network to g 0 is pro…table for farsighted agents having already one link as this allows them to move from a component of size smaller than n=2 to the minimally connected network g 0 , and it is pro…table for isolated agents which cannot be worse o¤ than by staying without partners. Notice in addition that each pairwise deviation from a network in the set is deterred by the threat of coming back at the same network.
The pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks described in Proposition 6 are not necessarily unique. Pareto ine¢ cient networks may also belong to some pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 1 Risk-sharing model with four agents (continued) Suppose that n = 4 and 1=12 < c 1=6. We then have that the set G composed of networks g 3 and g 4 depicted in Figure 1 constitutes a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks. To see this, notice that there is a farsighted improving path from each network other than g 5 ; g 6 ; g 7 ; g 8 ; g 9 going to g 3 and that g 4 2 F (g k ) for k = 5; 6; 7; 8; 9. Thus G satis…es condition (ii) of De…nition 2. The set G also satis…es condition (i) of De…nition 2 since g k 2 F (g k +ij) for all ij = 2 g k , for k = 1; 2 and g k 2 F (g k ij) for all ij 2 g k , for k = 1; 2. Notice that the networks g 3 and g 4 are not Pareto e¢ cient. For instance, g 3 is Pareto dominated by the network g 5 .
High costs of links formation
In Proposition 7, we show that when the cost of links formation is su¢ ciently high, (a) the set of all networks in which every agent belongs to a component of size 2 is the only pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks if the number of agent is even, (b) the set of all networks in which the same agent is not linked while the remaining agents belong to a component of size 2 is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks, and (c) the set G composed of one network from the set of networks composed of a maximal number of linked pairs among all the the agents but agent k and of one network from the set of network composed of a maximal number of linked pairs among all the the agents but agent l 6 = k is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks.
Proposition 7. If (n 2)=(2n) < c < 1=2, then
for all i 2 N g is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks if n is even.
is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks if 1=3 < c and n is odd, (c) The set G = fg k ; g l g, where for m 2 fk; lg, G m = fg 2 G j d i (g) = 1 for all i 2 N n fmg, and d m (g) = 0g is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks if 1=3 < c and n is odd.
When the costs of links formation are high, each agent prefers to be in a network in which he is a member of a component of size two rather than in any network in which her number of links is di¤erent than one. From any network that does not belong to the set of networks composed of a maximal number of linked pairs, agents having more than one link are willing to cut a link, and agents having no links are willing to add a link, looking forward to a network composed of a maximal number of linked pairs. Part (a) of the proposition is then derived from the fact that there are no farsighted improving paths emanating from a network composed of a maximal number of linked pairs if n is even. When the number of agents is odd, an agent, say k, is not connected in a network composed of a maximal number of linked pairs g 2 G k . We …nd that from each network outside G k , there is a farsighted improving path to each network in G k . Also, each deviation from G k is deterred by the threat of coming back at the same network in one step. Then, part (b) and part (c) of the proposition follows from the fact that there are no farsighted improving paths from a network in G k leading to another network in G k since each agent has the same utility in each network of G k . Notice that each network of a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks is Pareto e¢ cient, but not strongly e¢ cient when the cost of links formation is high.
The characterization of pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks when the cost of links formation is intermediate, i.e. when 1=n c (n 2)=(2n) for n even, or when (n 1)=(n(n + 1)) c maxf1=3; (n 2)=(2n)g for n odd, remains an open question. This value of c for which we have not been able to characterize the pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks is increasing with the size of the population n.
Let us summarize the results obtained concerning the structure of risk-sharing networks formed by farsighted agents and let us compare them with the networks formed by myopic agents and the e¢ cient ones. For very small costs of links formation (c 1=(n(n 1))) or high ones ((n 2)=(2n) < c when the population size is even, or minf(n 2)=(2n); 1=3g < c if the population size is odd), farsighted and myopic agents form the same networks. For very small costs of links formation every strongly e¢ cient network is stable while for high costs of links formation, stable networks are composed of a maximal number of linked pairs. Those networks are
Pareto e¢ cient. The networks formed di¤er however for small costs of links formation. When 1=(n(n 1)) < c < 1=n, each line connecting all the agents and other lines in which the degree of the agents is similar constitute a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks. Farsighted agents form strongly e¢ cient networks, while myopic agents cannot sustain those networks at equilibrium since from a strongly e¢ cient network, the agents have a myopic incentives to cut a link with a peripheral agent as long as 1=(n(n 1)) < c. Farsighted agents are not willing to cut this link as they anticipate that the others will in turn modify sequentially their choice of insurance partners so that the network that will form in the end will be the same line connecting all the agents. We return to the example where 4 agents may create mutual insurance arrangement to illustrate further this point.
Example 1 Risk-sharing model with four agents (continued) Let n = 4 and 1=12 < c < 1=4. Notice that the Pareto e¢ cient networks are the minimally connected networks for these parameters. If , each line of three agents is pairwise stable. The pairwise myopically stable set of networks is then composed of all the lines of three agents. We showed in the previous example that the set composed of two networks connecting minimally three agents constitutes a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks. This is true for each pair of line network of three agents in which the set of agents having one link in one network is di¤erent than the set of agents having one link in the other network. In addition, each line connecting 4 agents and the other line in which the degree of the agents is similar constitute a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks. If
, a line of 3 agents is not pairwise stable anymore since the agent that has two links in the line of 3 agents is willing to cut a link with a peripheral agent. In a dynamic game, a pair of myopic agents adds a link between them if they both belong to a component of same size, smaller than or equal to 2. Agents also delete a link with a peripheral agent if they are connected to 3 agents or more. This de…nes a cycle, where the networks of the cycle are such that two, three or four agents are indirectly connected. For these costs, each set composed of a line of 4 farsighted agents and the other line that is payo¤ equivalent for the agents is a farsightedly stable set of networks.
Conclusion
This paper analyzes which risk-sharing networks can be sustained in the long run when agents are farsighted, rather than myopic, in the sense that they are able to forecast how other agents would react to their actions. In particular, we study whether the farsightedness of the agents leads to a reduction of the tension between stability and e¢ ciency that may arise when agents are myopic. We …nd that if the cost of establishing a mutual insurance agreement is very high or very small, then myopic and farsighted agents form the same risk-sharing networks. For intermediate cost values, the farsightedness of the agents plays a crucial role in determining which network is stable. In addition, if a con ‡ict between myopic stability and e¢ ciency exists, it may be solved with the introduction of farsighted agents.
We have considered two extreme cases of rationality of the agents. In both cases, agents form minimally connected components since the direct connections do not provide more bene…ts than indirect ones. This feature is not observed on the …eld, where insurance networks are largely overlapping (De Weerdt and Dercon, 2005) . propose to introduce frictions in the risksharing process, implying that income would not be equalized in the component. In this alternative speci…cation, the position of an agent in a component matters, in addition to its size, and agents would form overlapping networks since the bene…ts of direct connections is greater than the bene…ts of indirect ones. Another variation, related to the rationality of the agents, could also help explaining the presence of overlapping networks. We could imagine that the farsightedness of the agents is local in the network, in the sense that agents could be able to better forecast the reactions of agents to which they are closely connected, let say because connected agents have more informations on each other, they communicate more, etc. Agents could then have incentives to create mutual insurance arrangements with agents to which they are indirectly connected, as it would improve the predictions they could make on the reaction of those agents, and take advantage of this better prediction.
We hope to study this extension in the future.
Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let c 1=2. Take a network g such that g 2 G m and for all (S; h) 2 C(g), we
have that #S b s. By contradiction, suppose that a network g 0 Pareto dominates the network g, that is g 0 satis…es u i (g 0 ) u i (g) for all i 2 N , with the inequality being strict for some i. Notice that, by de…nition of b s, each agent prefers to have l links in the network g rather than l + x links in any other network for some x positive. Thus, in the network g 0 , we have that
N . This condition can only be satis…ed if the number of components in g 0 is not smaller than in g. For a network e g composed of k minimally connected components, the sum of agent's utilities is i2N u i (e g) = k 2c(n k). Since c 1=2, it thus
one necessarily has u j (g 0 ) < u j (g) for some j 2 N , contradicting the fact that the network g 0 Pareto dominates the network g. We then conclude that g is Pareto e¢ cient.
The following lemma proves to be useful in establishing Proposition 2.
Lemma A.1. For all g 0 2 GnG , we have g 2 M (g 0 )
for some g 2 G .
Proof. Take a network g 0 2 G n G . Start with g 0 and let some pair of agents belonging to di¤erent components of size smaller than s add a link between them.
Repeating this operation leads to a network g 00 in which less than two components have a size smaller than s . Formally, let g 0 = g 0 . Then, for all k 2 N + , let
There is a threshold L
From g 00 , take successively a component that is strictly bigger than s and let an agent from this component delete a link with an agent that has exactly one link in that component. When all these links are deleted, we end up at network g 000 such that if (S; h) 2 C(g 000 ), then either (i) #S = 1 or (ii) #S = s , or (iii) 1 < #S < s and no other component
, build a sequence of networks where at each step k, a link is added between a singleton and an agent belonging to the biggest component of size strictly smaller than s in the network of that step g k . When all these links have been added, we end up in a network g 2 G .
Formally, let g 0 = g 000 and 8k 2 N + , let g k+1 = g k + ij where d i (g k ) = 0, j 2 S, and
Each move in the sequence of networks going from g 0 to g is pro…table by de…nition of s . We thus conclude that from a network g 0 2 G n G , we have that g 2 M (g 0 ) for some g 2 G .
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let G be the pairwise myopically stable set of networks. Suppose that s = s or s > s and n s + s , so that G consists only of pairwise stable networks.
By Lemma A.1, there is a myopic improving path from every network outside G to some pairwise stable network in G . However, the converse does not hold since each network in G is by itself a closed cycle. This establishes that there are no other closed cycle than the pairwise stable networks, that is G = G . If on the other hand s > s and n > s + s , then no pairwise stable network exists. By
Lemma A.1, we have that G \ G 6 = ?, say g 2 G \ G . Starting from the network g , we can reach any network g 2 G by adding links between members of di¤erent components of size s and s 0 where s; s 0 2 fs + 1; s g, by letting agents delete links with peripheral agents from components connecting more than s agents, and by adding links between a singleton and a member of a component connecting less than s agents. Since each of the suggested move is pro…table for the agents involved, we thus have g 2 M (g ) 8g 2 G . We then conclude that G G.
The following lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 3.
Lemma A.2. For a network g such that (S; h) 2 C(g) and #S > s=2, for i 2 S,
Proof. Let g 2 G be such that (S; h),(S 0 ; h 0 ) 2 C(g) and #S > s=2. Take agent 
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Let G be the pairwise myopically stable set of networks. Let c < 1=2. We show that each network g 2 G satis…es the conditions (i)-(iv) of b G.
(i) By contradiction, suppose that a network g 0 2 G is such that g 0 = 2 G m . Take the network g composed of minimally connected components obtained from g 0 by deleting unnecessary links. Formally, g is such that g 2 G m , and for all
Starting from g 0 and letting agents delete successively a link that belong to g 0 but not to g, we …nd that g 2 M (g 0 ). Thus the network g belongs to the same closed cycle C as the network g 0 . However, g 0 = 2 M (g), contradicting the fact that C is a closed cycle. Thus g 0 = 2 G.
(ii) By contradiction, suppose that a network g 0 2 G is such that (S; h) 2 C(g 0 ) with #S > s. Since #S > s s , an agent i 2 S is willing to cut the link ij pro…table. This in turn contradicts the fact that C is a closed cycle. It follows
(iii) Take a network g 0 such that d i (g 0 ) = s=2 + t, for some i 2 N , where t 2 N + 0 . By contradiction, suppose that g 0 2 G. Notice that agent i is in a component of size s i s=2 + t + 1 in g 0 . By (ii), we thus have that s=2 + t + 1 s i s.
This inequality and the fact that g 0 2 G m imply that agent i is connected to an agent, say j, that has no other link, ij 2 g 0 and d j (g 0 ) = 1. Notice also that s=2 + t + 1 > s when c < 1=2, so that s i s and agent i is willing to cut the link ij. We have g (iv.a) By contradiction, suppose that g 0 2 G such that d(g 0 ) = s 1 t, where t 2 f1; :::; s 1g. Notice that each network whose total number of links is strictly smaller than s 1 is composed of components of size strictly smaller than s . By de…nition of s , it follows that every pair of agents can pro…tably add a link from the network g 0 , i.e. g 0 + ij 2 M (g 0 ) 8ij = 2 g 0 . Thus g 0 and g 0 +ij are in the same closed cycle C. However g 0 = 2 M (g 0 +ij) since every path going from g 0 + ij to g 0 involves, at some step, the deletion of a link kl from a network g 00 such that d(g 00 ) = d(g 0 ) + 1. Since the network g 00 is composed of components of size smaller than or equal to s , the deletion of the link kl is neither pro…table for agent k, nor for agent l. This contradicts the fact that g 0 and g 0 + ij are in the same closed cycle. Thus g 0 = 2 G.
(iv.b) Take a network g 2 G. We show that d(g) n 1 int((n 1)=s). By part (i) of this proposition, we have that d(g) = n #C(g). By part (ii) of this proposition, the network g 0 2 G m composed of components of size s and of one component of size n int( n s )s is a network that has the lowest number of components among all the networks in G. Formally, g 0 2 arg min e g2G (#C(e g)).
Some more lemmas precede the proof of Proposition 4.
Lemma A.3. Let s > s and n > s + s . If g 2 G m with (S; h), (S 0 ; h 0 ) 2 C(g) and #S = s = #S 0 , then g n (S; h) 2 M (g).
Proof. Suppose that s > s and n > s + s . Take a network g 2 G m with
The following path describes a myopic improving path from g to g n (S; h). From g, add the link kl where k 2 S, l 2 S 0 .
agents k and l are willing to add this link since #S = s = #S 0 , and s s=2 when s > s and n > s + s . Then, during s 1 consecutive steps, an agent from S, say i 2 S, cuts a link with an agent, say j, that has exactly one link in the current network. Notice that j necessarily belongs to S. In the remaining network, agent l 2 S 0 cuts the link kl. Each time an agent deletes a link along the path, she moves from a component of size s to a component of size s 1. Since s > s , these moves are pro…table. Thus, g n (S; h) 2 M (g).
where s 2 f2; s+2 4 g, then u i (g) u i (g + ij) and u j (g) < u j (g + ij) for i 2 S and j 2 S 0 .
Proof. Take g 2 G m such that (S; h), (S 0 ; h 0 ) 2 C(g) and #S = s, #S 0 = s 1, where s 2 f2; (s + 2)=4g. Notice that the set of integers s satisfying 2 s (s + 2)=4 is nonempty if and only if s 6. To have u i (g) u i (g+ij) and u j (g) < u j (g+ij) for i 2 S and j 2 S 0 , the size s of the component (S; h) must satisfy c (s 1)=((2s 1)s).
This inequality is veri…ed when s 2 f2; (s+2)=4g. Indeed, for s = 6 and s = (s+2)=4,
we have that (s 1)=((2s 1)s) = 1=s > 1=c, while for 2 s < (s + 2)=4 and s 6, or for s > 6 and 2 s (s + 2)=4, we have that (s 1)=((2s 1)s) > 1=s > 1=c.
and only if #S s
and #S is even or if #S s=2 and #S is odd.
Proof. Let S N such that either #S is even and #S s, or #S is odd and #S s=2. Take a network g 0 such that for all i 2 S, d i (g 0 ) = 0, and a network
The network g is obtained from g 0 by adding links between the singletons from the set S in g 0 so that they are in a line in g. Consider the sequence of networks g 0 ; g 1 ; :::g K where g 0 = g, g K = g 0 and for all k 2 f0; :::; K 1g,
:::; g 0 ) describes a myopic improving path from g ; to g. Indeed, each move in the path involves the addition of a link between 2 agents from di¤erent components of equal size s s=2 or between 2 agents from di¤erent components of size s 0 and s 0 1 respectively with 2 s 0 (s + 2)=4 (see Lemma A.4).
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Let s > s , n > s +s and c = 2 [(n 1)=(n(n+1)); 1=n] when n is odd. Let G be the pairwise myopically stable set of networks. Notice that an agent from a component of size s is willing to add a link with an agent from another component of size s if s > s . It then follows that s=2 s when s > s .
By Proposition 2, G \ G 6 = ?. Take g 2 G \ G. We will show that there is a
implying that g 2 G. In part (i) of the proof, we will show that this holds for d = n 1 int((n 1)=s), and we consider the remaining cases in part (ii) of the proof.
(i.1) If 2s n, then g is composed of one component of size s and another of size n s and s n s > s . It follows that any two members of the di¤erent components are willing to add a link between them. We then conclude that g = g + ij 2 M (g ) for some link ij, and d(g) = n 1 int((n 1)=s).
(i.2) Suppose that n > 2s and c = 2 [(n 1)=(n(n + 1)); 1=n] when n is odd. Denote
repeatedly Lemma A.3 to build the network g 0 composed of 2 b k components of size s and of singletons. Formally, g 0 is such that #f(S; h) 2 C(g 0 ) j In the remaining network, the singletons pro…tably add links between them to form a minimally connected component of size n int( n s ) < s , leading to a network g 2 M (g ) such that d(g) = n 1 int((n 1)=s).
(ii) We have shown in part (i) that some networks g 0 2 G are such that d(g 0 ) = n 1 int((n 1)=s). We show here that there is a network g 2 M (g 0 ) such that d(g) = d for any d 2 fs 1; n 1 int((n 1)=s)g, implying that g 2 G. We 9 if n > s, the network g 000 is composed of one component of size s=2 and of singletons. If n s and n is even, the network g 000 is composed of one component of size n=2 and of singletons. If n s and n is odd, the network g 000 is composed of one component of size (n + 1)=2 and of singletons. 10 Notice that if n is odd, int(n=2) = (n 1)=2. 
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Let c 1=(n(n 1)). Notice that if any pair of agents i; j 2 N are not indirectly connected at a network g, then they are better o¤ at the network g + ij,
for ij = 2 g, than at the network g, when c 1=(n(n 1)).
(a) To prove this result, we will show that each farsighted improving path emanating from a line g of n agents reaches a strongly e¢ cient network. Thus, a set of networks G 0 that does not contain a strongly e¢ cient network does not satisfy condition (ii) of De…nition 2. Formally, take a network g 2 G L . Notice that g Pareto dominates g 0 for each g 0 2 G n G M since c 1=(n(n 1)). This implies that g 0 = 2 F (g). By contradiction, assume that the set G 0 such that
is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks. We then have
, contradicting the fact that G 0 satis…es condition (ii) of De…nition 2.
(b) Take a network e g 2 G M and let G = fg 2 G j u i (g) = u i (e g) for all i 2 N g.
In order to prove that G is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks, we will show that (b.i) e g 2 F (g 0 ) for every g 0 2 G n G and (b.ii) F (g) \ G = ; for every g 2 G and hence, Theorem 3 in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) applies. (b.i) Take g 0 2 G n G. Start from g 0 and build a sequence of networks where at each step, an agent that has more links than at the network e g cuts a link.
When all these links have been deleted, we end up at the network g 00 such
) for all i 2 N . Notice that there are at most n 1 links in
) for all i 2 N , then g 00 2 G and g 00 2 F (g 0 ) since each agent involved in a move from g 0 to g 00 has less links at g 00 than in g 0 but belongs to a component of equal size. (b.i.2) If u i (g 00 ) 6 = u i (e g) for some i 2 N , then there is an agent j for which d j (g 00 ) 1 and u j (g 00 ) < u j (e g) by e¢ ciency of e g. This agent cuts one link and we reach the network g 000 which contains at most n 2 links, so that the biggest component of g 000 does not connect all the population. In g 000 and in the successive networks, an agent that has l links in a component of size s cuts a link, looking forward to the formation of the network e g, if she has l + x links or less in e g in a component of size n s + x.
Formally, Let g 1 = g 000 and for all k 2 f1; :::
Notice that in each network g k of the path, we can always …nd an agent i satisfying
The network that is reached through this path is g d(g 1 ) = g ; . Each agent involved in a move from g 000 to g ; , looking forward to the formation of the network e g, is willing to do so since c 1=(n(n 1)). Once in g ; , every path going from the empty network to e g by adding links only describes a farsighted improving path since agents have incentives to build each link of a minimally connected network when c 1=(n(n 1)). We thus conclude that e g 2 F (g 0 ) for every
(c) Take a pair of networks g 1 ; g 2 2 G M such that u i (g 1 ) 6 = u i (g 2 ) for some agent i 2 N , and g 1 and g 2 are not star networks. Let G = fg 1 ; g 2 g. In order to prove that G is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks, we will show that it satis…es conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) of De…nition 2.
(c.i) Every deviation from a network in the set is deterred by the threat of coming back in one step to the same network. Indeed, from the network g k + ij, for ij = 2 g k , agent i is willing to delete the link ij looking forward to the network g k for k = 1; 2. Similarly, from the network g k ij, for ij 2 g k , agents i and j are willing to add the link ij looking forward to g k for k = 1; 2. We have that
(c.ii) We have shown in part (b.i) that g 1 2 F (g 0 ) for every g 0 2 G n G 1 , where
It thus remains to show that
(c.iii) By contradiction suppose that some subset G 0 G is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks. Without loss of generality, suppose that G 0 = fg 1 g.
Then, the condition (ii) of De…nition 2 is not satis…ed since g 1 = 2 F (g 0 ) for g 0 2 G 1 n fg 1 g, contradicting the fact that G 0 is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks.
The following lemma is central to the proof of Proposition 6.
Proof. Suppose that c < 1=n if n is even, or that c < (n 1)=(n(n + 1)) if n is odd.
For such costs, two agents i and j in di¤erent components of size int((n + 1)=2) and int(n=2) at a network g both prefer the network g + ij to the network g. Take a network g 2 G L . Let g 0 = g ij where ij 2 g, i 2 Ce(N; g) and j 2 Ce(N; g) if n is even such that the network g 0 is composed of one component of size int((n + 1)=2) and another of size int(n=2). The following path is a farsighted improving path from g ; to g. From g ; , add successively each link kl 2 g 0 until the network g 0 is formed.
agents i and j then add the link ij. Let g 00 be a network of the path going from g ; to g in which agent k 2 N adds a link. If d k (g 00 ) = 0, agent k compares her utility if she remains alone in g 00 (u k (g 00 ) = 1) with her utility in g (if n = 2, u k (g) = 1 2 c while if n 4, u k (g) 1=n 2c), and prefers to add the link since c < 1=n. If d k (g 00 ) = 1, it is pro…table for agent k to add a link looking forward to the network g since she belongs to a component of size smaller than or equal to int((n + 1)=2)
in g 00 , implying that u k (g 00 ) 1 int((n+1)=2) c < 1=n 2c = u k (g). Since g was chosen arbitrarily, we have that g 2 F (g ; ) for all g 2 G L .
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof.
Suppose that c < 1=n if n is even or that c < (n 1)=(n(n + 1)) if n is odd. In order to prove that G is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks, we will show that (i) Take g 0 2 G n G. Start from g 0 and build a sequence of networks where at each step, an agent that has more links than at the end network g 1 cuts a link. When all these links have been deleted, we end up at the network g 00 such
g 00 2 G and g 00 2 F (g 0 ) since each agent involved in a move from g 0 to g 00 has at g 00 less links than in g 0 but belongs to a component of equal size. (i.2) If u i (g 00 ) 6 = u i (g 1 ) for some i 2 N , then there is an agent j for which d j (g 00 ) 1
and u j (g 00 ) < u j (g 1 ) by e¢ ciency of g 1 . This agent cuts one link, looking forward to g 1 , and we reach the network g 000 having the property that the size of the biggest component of g 000 is smaller than n. In g 000 , and in the successive networks, agents having 2 links cut one link. They are willing to do so since they are looking forward to g 1 where they belong to a bigger component and pay at worse the same cost. When all these links have been deleted, we are in a network composed of components of size 2 and of singletons. agents having a link successively cut this link to reach g ; looking forward to g 1 . This is pro…table for them since u i (g 1 ) 1=2 c for all i 2 N . From g ; , there is a farsighted improving path leading to g 1 (Lemma A.6). We conclude that
(
The following lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 7.
Lemma A.7. If n is odd, then for all g 0 2 G n G k , where
Proof. Let n be odd and let maxf1=3; (n 2)=(2n)g < c < 1=2. Take k 2 N and
Notice that an agent prefers a network in which she has one link to any network in which she has two or more links when (n 2)=(2n) < c < 1=2. We where at each step, either a singleton adds a link that belongs to the network g, or an agent that has two links deletes a link that does not belong to the network g until the network g is reached.
Step 1a: A singleton in g 0 other than agent k adds a link that belongs to the network g. Since at least one agent, say i, has no link at g 0 then u i (g 0 ) = 1 < u i (g) = 1=2 c, thus agent i is willing to add the link looking forward to g. The other agent, say j, has either no link at g 0 or he has one link in a component of size 2. In both cases, she agrees to add the link ij looking forward to g.
Step 1b: In the remaining network, if an agent has two links, she deletes a link that does not belong to g. This agent is willing to delete a link looking forward to g where she has one link.
Step l: Proceed inductively in l, if an agent other than agent k is a singleton, she adds a link that belongs to g ; then, on the remaining network, if an agent has two links, she deletes a link that does not belong to g.
Step L: When all these links are added or removed, we end up at the network g.
We conclude that g 2 F (g 0 ). Since the choice of g 2 G k does not matter, we conclude that G k F (g 0 ):
(ii) If d i (g 0 ) > 1 for some agent i 2 N , then start with g 0 and build a sequence of networks where at each step, some agent other than agent k that has more than one link deletes a link. When all these links have been deleted, if agent k has more than one link, she successively deletes all her links but one so that the network g 000 is reached with d i (g 000 ) 1 8i 2 N . From g 000 , there is a farsighted improving path going to g (see part (i) of the proof of this lemma).
Step 1a: An agent, say i, that has more than one link deletes a link ii 0 such that i 0 6 = k and agent i 0 has exactly one link at the current network. Repeat this step until a network is reached in which the agents that have more than one link are connected to agents that have also more than one link.
Step 1b:
In the remaining network, let an agent, say j, that has more than one link, delete a link di¤erent than the link jk. An agent deleting a link in one of those steps is willing to do so as she has at least 2 links at the network where she deletes a link and she is looking forward to g in which she has one link.
Step l: Proceed inductively in l, each time an agent, say i, with two links or more is connected to an agent other than agent k that has exactly one link, agent i deletes that link. Then, on the remaining network, an agent that has two links or more, say agent j, deletes a link other than the link jk.
Step L: When all these links have been deleted, a network g 00 is reached such that d i (g 00 ) 1, 8i 2 N n fkg.
Step L + 1: If agent k has 2 links or more, she successively deletes all her links but one. agent k has s links in a component of size s + 1 for some s 2 at a network where she deletes a link. Let us call by g 1 such a network. agent k is willing to delete a link in g 1 looking forward to g since u k (g 1 ) < u k (g) = 1 when c > 1=3.
Step L + 2: We are in a network g 000 such that d i (g 000 ) 1, 8i 2 N and g 000 = 2 G k by construction. In part (i) of this proposition we have shown that G k 2 F (g 000 ). We conclude that G k 2 F (g 0 ).
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Let (n 2)=(2n) < c < 1=2. Notice that an agent prefers a network in which she has one link to any network in which she has two or more links when (n 2)=(2n) < c.
(a) Suppose that n is even and that. Let G = fg 2 G j d i (g) = 1 for all i 2 N g. In order to prove that G is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks, we will show that (a.i) for every g 0 2 G n G, we have that F (g 0 ) \ G 6 = ; and some agent that has more than one link deletes a link until we reach a network g 00 such that d i (g 00 ) 1 8i 2 N . If g 00 2 G, then g 00 2 F (g 0 ) since each agent involved in a move from g 0 to g 00 has at least two links in the networks in which she deletes a link and is looking forward to the network g 00 in which she has one link. If g 00 = 2 G, we know from (a.i.1) that a network g 000 2 G can be reached through a farsighted improving path from g 00 . Each agent involved in a move from g 0 to g 00 looking forward to g 000 is better o¤ in the end network rather than in the network in which she cuts a link since she reduces her number of links to one by doing so. We thus conclude that F (g 0 ) \ G 6 = ;.
(a.ii) By contradiction, suppose that F (g) 6 = ;, say g 0 2 F (g), for some network g 2 G. Then, at least an agent, say i, is willing to create or delete a link from g looking forward to g 0 , u i (g) < u i (g 0 ). Having u i (g) < u i (g 0 ) implies that agent i has exactly one link in g 0 and belongs to a component of size strictly bigger than 2. Then, at least an agent, say j, has 2 links or more in g 0 . However, every path going from g to g 0 is such that the payo¤ of agent j is smaller in g 0 than in the network in which she has to add a second link. This contradicts the fact that g 0 2 F (g). Thus F (g) = ;.
(b) Suppose that n is odd and that 1=3 < c. We have that (b.i) for every g 0 2 G n G k , F (g 0 ) \ G k 6 = ; (see Lemma A.7), and (b.ii) for every g 2 G k , F (g) \ G k = ;, since u i (g) = u i (g 0 ) for all i 2 N , for all g; g 0 2 G. Hence, Theorem 3 in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) applies, G k is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks.
(c) Suppose that n is odd and 1=3 < c. Take g k 2 G k and g l 2 G l such that k 6 = l. In order to prove that G = fg k ; g l g is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks, we will show that G satis…es the three conditions of De…nition 2.
(c.i) Every deviation from a network in the set is deterred by the threat of coming back in one step at the same network. Indeed, from the network g k + ij, where ij = 2 g k , agent i is willing to delete link ij looking forward to g k if i 6 = k. If i = k, then agent j is willing to delete link ij. Similarly, from the network g k ij, where ij 2 g k , agent i and j are willing to add link ij looking forward to g k . We have that g k 2 F (g k + ij) for all ij = 2 g k , and g k 2 F (g k ij) for all ij 2 g k . By symmetry, deviations from g l are also deterred.
(c.ii) We have shown in Lemma A.7 that g k 2 F (g 0 ) for every g 0 2 G n G k . It thus remains to show that g l 2 F (g 0 ) for every g 0 2 G k n fg k g. By Lemma A.7, we have that g l 2 F (g 0 ) for every g 0 2 G n G l . The statement g l 2 F (g 0 ) for every g 0 2 G k n fg l g is then derived from G l \ G k = ;.
(c.iii) Suppose by contradiction that some subset G 0 G is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks. Without loss of generality, suppose that G 0 = fg k g. We then have that condition (ii) of De…nition 2 is not satis…ed since g k = 2 F (g 0 ) for g 0 2 G k n fg k g, contradicting the fact that G 0 is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks. Thus, G satis…es the minimality condition.
